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Emerging Defense Industries: 
Prospects and Implications 
J. D. Kenneth Boutin 
Defense industrializat10n 1n less developed areas is hardly a new phenomenon, but only be-
came widespread following World War II. The contemporary defense -industrial landscape 
features a substantial body of emerging producers alongside the established producers of 
the developed industrial states. The ranks of the defense-industrial producers expanded 
greatly following World War II as political authorities in newly independent states sought to 
develop local capabilities for the production and development of armaments, while authori-
lies in states that were already independent sought to enhance existing defense industries. 
I kspite results that were are often disappointing, defense industrialization remains an im-
1)()l'lant policy objective throughout the developing world. 
Perspectives on the emergence of new or significantly more capable defense-industrial 
1)( IIll1lCerS vary greatly. While defense industrialization is supported by some as a means of 
Ilv('l'coming the dependency inherent in relying on other states for crucial arms supplies, 
tjll'rt:by enhancing national sovereignty, or as an important vehicle for economic develop-
1111'111, others are concerned about its contribution to the potentially destabilizing prolifera-
111111 or advanced military capabilities, the eroding effectiveness of arms trade controls, or 
1111' potentially negative socioeconomic effects of defense industrialization. The complexity 
III 11ll' issues involved and the politico-military implications of defense industrialization in 
.In·duping states ensure that this will continue to be the subject of intense scholarly and 
1,,,1,, }' debate. 
III i 0; chapter analyses the prospects and implications of defense industrialization in de-
\ \,1, II Ii 11g states. It considers the objectives underlying efforts to develop indigenous defense-
IHoit!".! ri ,1I capabilities, the benefits this has for the states concerned, and the politico-military 
111'1 Ii" ,II i UIlS of defense industrialization. While resource and structural obstacles limit the 
,I. , "I, 'l'lllent of extensive national capabilities in many cases, defense industrialization still 
, ,,' III 1I'I IIl'S to important national objectives, and policy interest in this remains strong as 
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a result. the most impressive defense-industrial strides are being made in the emerging 
industrial states, but even here this is not producing defense-industrial autonomy. The dis-
tinct nature of defense industrialization in these states, where this is integral to general 
processes of industrial and technological development involving extensive transnational 
integration, highlights the need to reconsider some of the assumptions that have guided 
analyses of developing state defense industrialization. 
IMPORTING THE EUROPEAN ARSENAL? 
Defense industrialization in developing states is generally examined through a conceptual 
lens informed by the example of the developed industrial states. It is commonly accepted 
that political authorities in developing states aspire to defense-industrial capabilities similar 
to those that supposedly characterize European, North American, and select Asian states 
such as Japan, and that they will develop these capabilities incrementally. These expecta-
tions provide a useful starting point for analyzing relevant trends and developments, but 
must be qualified in respect to the developing slates. While political authorities in mall)' 
developing states appear intent on emulating the defense industries comlllonly identified 
with the developed industrial states, more complex pulicy requirements. structural impetl i 
ments, and the increasingly demanding developmental and production reqllircmelll~ 01 
advanced arms may result in defense industrialization that differs significantly from thaI ill 
the developed states. 
The classical model of defense industrialization that is informed by expectations deri v i III', 
from the developed industrial states involves the progressive development of increasingl), 
sophisticated and autonomous indigenous capabilities for arms-related production and II' 
search and development (R&D). This model assumes that political authorities are intereskd 
in establishing an independent capability to meet the full range of their arms requirellll'llh, 
and that the route by which they do so will be linear. The logic inherent in the gradual dl' 
velopment of national capabilities that is manifest in this understanding of defense illd'I'. 
trialization contributes to its continuing currency in scholarly and policy circles. 
The conventional wisdom regarding defense industrialization is reflected in cll()/'I', III 
categorize developing states' defense industries in terms of distinct capability tiers, ;",.1 III 
the development of templates identifying sequential developmental stages in defeflSl' i 111111" 
trialization.1 These constitute useful descriptive devices and offer general guides fIll 11111 
sidering potential defense-industrial trajectories in developing states. Both must Ill' II'" d 
with caution, however. There are major difficulties inherent in attempting to catq',llIlll 
defense-industrial activities, which are compounded in the case of the emerging illdll'oIll," 
states by the crucial role of foreign industrial and technological assets, while elroll'. I .. d. 
velop suitable templates are complicated by often-significant intersectoral differelll''', iII .. 1 
the sporadic nature of defense-industrial development in many developing stall's. I ""~I,jI, ' 
this, defense-industrial programs in developing states are commonly assessed C1~',;\III'lt Ii!a-
standard of the developed industrial states. 
The classical model of defense industrialization is relevant to the developillg st.lIn p,. 
litical authorities in many cases are interested in following the defense-industrial lto.ltll" ,Ii. 
developed industrial states, both in terms of objectives and the course by wlli, II1III \ ,\1' 
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attained. It is also often the case that defense-industrial capabilities develop very gradually. 
As noted below, however, defense-industrial programs do not necessarily conform to of-
ficial statements, and the protracted nature of defense industrialization does not necessarily 
reflect a methodical developmental approach. It is important to move beyond a focus on 
policy declarations and to consider the factors underlying the nature of defense industrial-
ization in developing states in analyzing its prospects and implications. 
Defense-industrial objectives and developmental patterns in the developing states are 
examined below. lhis indicates the extent to which defense industrialization in developing 
states differs from the classical model. While, generally, developing state defense industrial-
ization falls well short of providing sustainable comprehensive national capabilities, it still 
offers important politico-military and other benefits to the states concerned. 
The Objectives of Defense Industrialization 
National security concerns are generally assumed to drive defense industrialization. Na-
lional security constitutes an issue of great importance-if not the primary focus-of 
authorities in many states, and it is not coincidental that fluctuating interest in defense 
industrialization often corresponds to changes in the national security environment. An 
increased emphasis on defense industrialization characterizes periods of international ten -
sioll or conflict, sltch as thalleading up to World War II and during the cold war.2 It is note-
worthy that the more ambitious defense-industrial programs in the developing world tend 
I() be found in states with strong national security concerns, slIch as India, Iran, Pakistan, 
;Illd South Africa. 
'1 he political implications of dependence on foreign arms suppliers underpin the impor-
Lilice of defense industrialization to national security. The arms supply environment can 
hI' ullpredictable and unreliable, particularly during periods of heightened international 
It'llsion, and there is considerable scope for arms suppliers to exploit the political leverage 
I iley have with developing state customers. There are numerous cases of developing states 
I'l'illg embargoed or otherwise encountering major difficulties in securing adequate arms 
"llpplics during times of conflict. Iran, for example, suffered considerable material losses 
.1111 i Ilg the early stages of its war with Iraq as a result of the u.s, arms embargo imposed 
,1111'1 l he overthrow of the shah.3 
( :llilcerns stemming from the vagaries of the international arms market encourage the 
,ltl'l'lopment of national capabilities to meet the material requirements of local defense 
, ·oI .ddisilll1ents, Developing a defense-industrial base capable of independently develop-
'"f: ,lIld producing the full range of arms required is necessary if states are to escape their 
011'\ 'l'fldL'llce on external suppliers and maximize their political freedom of action, Some 
'"1011 ~I',I s argue that this objective is so crucial that political authorities in developing states 
'III ' IIll'pared to subordinate economic development to the requirements of defense indus-
II "tll/.11 illl!. '1 The particular types of arms that national defense industries need to be able to 
""I'I,lr ;\IHI support vary considerably between states. It is generally the case, however, that 
lid, 111\'()lvl's advanced, high-technology arms as well as more low technology arms, given 
II" lI,tim(' or contemporary warfare. Qualitative considerations are crucial given the impli-
ili"II '. ql heing unable at least to match the military capabilities of potential international 
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rivals. This encourages efforts to develop and maintain substantial technological leads in 
crucial arms categories, which depends on a sustained national capacity for arms-related 
R&D as well as production. 
The development of autonomous capabilities is also crucial to defense industrialization's 
contribution to national security, as a reliance on external sources of technology, compo-
nents, production equipment, and even design cues can involve dependence no less than 
the import of complete arms.s At any rate, relying on external resources is not necessarily 
as straightforward as it first appears, as this may still require considerable adaptation or 
indigenization to meet local requirements. Autonomy demands a defense-industrial base 
that is organized along territorial lines, with key activities located within and under the ef-
fective control of the state in question. The specific requirements of autonomy vary from 
case to case based on the perceived nature of the military threat, but in general, the greater 
the capacity of a state's defense-industrial base to provide and support arms independently, 
the more it enhances national security. 
While security is clearly important to authorities in the developing states, understand -
ings of security and the nature of security threats may differ considerably from those or 
the developed states. The security agendas of developing states may reflect a primary foclls 
on internal security issues, or approach national security in the context of a regional env! 
ronment where potential rivals pose little threat because of their underdeveloped military 
capabilities. It may even be the case that security concerns of a nontraditional nature, wh irh 
do not focus on the state at all, constitute the primary focus of concern. This has major illl 
plications for the defense-industrial agendas of developing states. 
Political authorities in many developing states regard a defense-industrial base as crulial 
in national security terms, and indicate their intention of developing a national capacity lill 
the development and production of a comprehensive range of arms. The postwar rccold 
of defense industrialization is mixed, however. Authorities may formulate very ambitillll" 
defense-industrial agendas, which often extend to developing autonomous national 1'1 .. 
duction and R&D capabilities for the full range of arms required. In many cases, defcJl.~l' ill 
dustrialization is pursued regardless of its economic viability, with states seeking to d cw' t. 'II 
and produce arms that could be imported easily and affordably. Ine common pJ'<lcl ill' 01 
basing defense industries around a state armaments sector results from recognition 01 r I I' 
fact that ensuring that they are state owned or administered maximizes national aulolll'lIII 
Political authorities may go to extraordinary lengths to maintain this. Defense-illdll ,~r, i," 
protectionism such as restrictions on foreign ownership is quite common, for eX<ll11p!.-. I'" 
authorities seek to shelter crucial industries from potentially detrimental markl'l lOll n 
Political authorities may even accept qualitative sacrifices in the interest of supporl i Il,~ "" ,II 
firms. These features demonstrate the importance attached to defense industriali,;" i011 l" 
many developing states for reasons of national security. 
This must be balanced against the fact that, in many developing states, no ,1111'1111'1 I , 
made to autonomously develop and produce a comprehensive range of arms. Politi! Iii ,w 
thorities tend to be very selective in deciding which defense-industrial capabili! il", In II>' 
velop. While an import -substitution focus is a common feature of defense inclll.~11 i.lI" .,11,,1, 
in developing states, national objectives are often quite modest. Authorities gCIll'I.IIII' I", ", 
on developing particular strategic defense-industrial capabilities, and are oCkl! \'1' 1,,11\,1 
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to accept a high level of foreign input in what they do develop and produce. Only rarely 
do states attempt to develop a completely autonomous capacity for the development, pro-
duction, and support of arms. It may be the case, for example, that efforts are made to 
develop extensive national capabilities in a limited range of arms, while continuing to rely 
on foreign support in others. Political authorities often choose the path ofleast resistance in 
choosing to develop local capabilities for low-risk, low-technology arms such as small arms, 
while accepting crucial ongoing foreign support for more advanced arms such as combat 
aircraft and armored vehicles. 
Security does not necessarily constitute the sole determinant of defense industrializa-
tion in developing states. Even where the requirements of national security are paramount, 
economic and political considerations may play an important role. Economic objectives are 
particularly prominent in developing states. As well as providing employment opportuni-
ties, defense industrialization is often approached as an important vehicle for industrial and 
technological progn' ss. Authorities in developing states frequently expect that successful 
defense-industrial development will constitute a catalyst for national development.6 De-
fense industrialization's cllieHc), in this respect derives from its potential effect in spurring 
local industry to enhance its technological capaci t}' il lld managerial skills, and through the 
industrial offsets-particularly technology transfers- that commonly accompany arms 
transfers. Arms transfers are sometimes closely linked to national development efforts in 
developing states and, as a result. The issue of the anticipated economic benefits can be de-
cisive in the awarding of contracts.7 
A further set of potential ohjectives involves polit ical sla llll't: and prestige. Political au-
thorities in some sti.llcs consider the development and production of advanced arms to be 
indicative of the level of national developmenl.H '[his perspective encourages a focus on 
high-profile arms such as combat c\irCrtlft , armored vehicles, and missile systems. These 
have considerable symbolic value, but such a focus may not be sustainable and may produce 
irregular patterns of defense industrialization, unless this is pursued in conjunction with 
Illore conventional defense-industrial objectives. 
It should be noted that the varied defense-industrial objectives of developing states are 
\lot entirely mutually incompatible. Defense industrialization in many cases is distinguished 
hy multiple objectives. This can have as great an impact on patterns of defense industrializa-
lioll as the resource and structural obstacles facing developing states . 
1'lIllems of Defense Industrialization 
1',Iltems of defense industrialization in the developing world often do not conform to the 
I I.Issieal model, although certain features of this model are found in a number of developing 
~Lltt·s. 'I his includes the efforts made to use current capabilities as a basis fo r further prog-
I .... ~ ;lIld the interest in developing defense-industrial capabilities gradually, oy progreSS ing 
1\11111 relatively simple activities such as the assembly of foreign arms under license to co~ 
1'1 oIdl1c1ion of foreign designs, and from there on to increasingly independent production 
,llId I{&D. These features are by no means universal, however. 
Ihl' development of defense-industrial capabilities in developing states is often neither 
Itlll'dI' tlor systematic. In many cases, defense industrialization appears more opportunistic 
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than deliberate. Particular defense-indust rial capabilities may emerge as a resulL of oppor-
tunities that ar ise through polit ical ties or the offs ets accom panying arms purchases. [ t m ay 
als o be the case that perceived structural and resource limitations exer t a strong influence 
on defense-i ndustria1trajectories by affecting the choke of projects or the nature and extent 
of local participation.9 While this may be wise in cases where it results in defense industri -
alization being well-grounded in local industrial capabilities, it may tim it future uevelop-
men La] op tions. 
Another important factor is the potential effect of overly optimist ic pla ns and expecta-
tions. 1his m ay affect the degree of local content, the technological soph istication of anTIS, 
or the time fr ame involved in their development and production . Overambitious defense-
ind ustr ial programs often result where impatience wi th a morc gradual approach leads 
polit ical aut horities to attempt to leap ahead by ordering arms into prodw:.:l ion whose de-
signs are still im maturc. Egypt, for exam ple, initiated an abortive national ballistic mis~ile 
program in the 1960s, despite its underdeveloped industrial base.l!) PolitiGd author it ies in 
many developing states have discovered Lhat unrealistic initiatives are difficult to bring to 
fru iti on. 
1hese factors help to account for the apparent illogic of d efense ind us tria lization in m all}' 
developing states. Often, defense industrialization does not involve a linear p rogression i ll 
the developmen t of capabilities, and may even involve ve ry intermi ttent effurts, with till' 
resu lt that particular national capabil ities may .~tagnate or even lapse. It also often fa ils 1(1 
conform to best practice as this is understood in the developed states. There may be majo l 
interscctoral differences in development patte rns as auth orities fo cus on the dcveloptnt'1\1 
of p artic ular niche capabilities. While sustained interest in defense indus trial ization acm.,.; 
Lhe developing world demonst rales the im portan ce th at is attached to it, patterns of dcfl' Il .~ 4' 
industrializatiun highlight the probiem atic n ature of convent ional understandings of ti,' 
fensc indus tr ialization in many cases. 
The Emerging Industrial States 
The difficulties involved in attem pt ing Lo reconcile developing stat e defense industriali/.I 
tion with conventional expectations are greatest with respect to those developing st all'S t I, .d 
can be classified as emerging industrial states. lhe members of this select group of statn ,1/1 
dist inguished by their impressive in dust rial and technological st rides. Though these :-. 1.11 , '" 
which include Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, are often still considered de vl'I"I"nl~ 
they have develop ed well past most of the developing states. It is important to di (ter CIII,,," 
between the emerging industrial states and the other developi ng states in defense- ,nil ll ',11 l. tI 
terms, as the former are demonstrat ing a growing (apacit;! to close the defense-illdll·,lt l,tI 
gap wi th the developed in dustrial states. The emerging industrial states arc ma king 1 ~ !l11I1 
p rogress in overcoming resource an d struc tural obstacles and are d eveloping <.' ;o( k ll ·, III 
dcicnse-industria1 capabilities. Political aUlhorities in these statcs have formui'ltl'.1 II I \ 
ambitious defense-industrial agend as, to which they appear very cummitted o v\.' , I II' · I, 'lOr. 
term. 
'lhe emerging industrial states arc d istinguished by more than t.heir defense j' lll" .III.! 
successes. It also is the case that patterns of defense ind us trialization in these ~ I.Ik'. Ii,,,,, 
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greatly both from the other developing stHlcs and from the classical model of defense in-
dust rialization, The success of their developrnent;-tl approach has the potential to encourage 
other developing states to follow suit , though in most cases they lack tile capacity to do so 
effectively at the present lime, 
' I he defense-industrial programs of the eillerging industria l states are based on global-
ization. Processes of global iza tion aft-ecting the defense-i ndustrial landscape emerged in 
the 19XOs and continue to deepen , driven by commercia l pressures and a degree of politi-
cal acquiescence in caSes where authorities recognize its necessity, These processes did not 
originat<: ill the defense ficld, but similar prcssu res .ue making themselves fel t here as well." 
Thi s slru,tu ral trans fo rmation is impacting on defense indlLstrics in all increasing Ilumber 
of slate~, It is servi ng to integrate the defense industries of developing states into trans-
national industrial networks, and provides considerable polential for the development of 
niche capabili ties on the part of developing stales, ll 
'I heir i mpressi ve develu pmenta I and defense -i nd ustrial prug ress testifies to t he pros pee ts 
for states to exploit the opportunities stemming from the ongoing structurallransf()rmation 
of the technological environment. This tramftHmation involves increasingly transnational 
processes of technological development,. application, and diffusion, 'fhis deepening tech-
nological globalization provides increasing oppor tunities for states that are in a position to 
participate in these processes, 'I he export-oriented economies of the emerging indusLrial 
"lales arc highly integrated illto transnational industrial networks, enabling them to engage 
l(m_'lgn fi rms in advanced R&D and produc tion through interfirm alliances and partner-
ships, This is providing firms in emerging industrial states with a growing capacity to draw 
Oil I{lreign industrial and technological resourCeS as they contribute to foreign-based R&D 
alld production programs, enanling them to narrow-~ if not clnse~technological gapsY 
' I h is is having a m ajor impact in defense-indus tr ial terms, The extensive industrial ties 
wllh foreign firms, many of which are based in the develuped industrial states , are provid-
Illg illcreasing opportunities to undertake the development and production of advanced 
II Ins, a lld they arc well-positioned to draw on foreign technological assets on a sustained 
II.l ~is , 1 1 'nlC defense-industrial programs of the emerging industrial statcs stand to benefit 
"IHII 'lllOliSly from enhanced access to defense-related technologies, This can include shar-
I l lf~ developmental and production costs and reducing the risks involved, increasing access 
11 1 10 Il"t' ig n technological so urces and R&D facilities. promoLi ng econom ies of scale, and 
1.11 Il llalillg access to export markets, Advanced arms su ch as Taiwan's Ching-Kuo fig h ler 
<llId Siluth Korea's Golden Eagle trainer have benefited from such ties, 
1111:-; model differs from the efforts made by some developing staLes to supplement in -
IIIWIIC Il IS defense-industrial capabilities wit h foreign inputs by its long-term nature and 
tIL, ' ""kIll to which Lhis is being pursued in concert with general national industrial and 
I, , 1IIlIJlogical development. This goes well beyond the practice of most developing states, 
1\ hI. 11 I olll i nue to rely on fo reign support, such as dual-usc technologies and components, 
LUi ",!rldl ~ee this as :J temporary expedient, Technological globalization enables emerg-
IIJI~ II,duslrial sLate firms to enter high-technology product areas at a higher point on the 
I '1I IIIIIl', \ 1I! VC, increases the potential for local firms to assi m ilate advanced technologies, 
,mol ' 1I ', l. lil li> their progress th rough continued access to technology that is at or near the 
.I 'l l. ,J! 111\' iiI!. 'Ihis includes enhanced pote ntial to access offshore R&D and production 
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facillties in a manner sim ilar to Germany during the interwar period, when acccs~ to for-
eign research fac il ities and fa cto ries in the Soviet Union and elsewhere ena bled it to pursue 
arms programs prohibited under the Versailles Treaty lS 
The impact of the general indu. l ri al trends involved in technological globalization is 
being enhanced by the growing importance of the private sector in <1nm-rel<1ted R& D and 
production in th e emerging industrial states. In some cases, this involves the privatization 
of state-owned d efense firms, and in others a major attitude shift in accepting that non -s tate 
actors are able to contribute to the d evelopment of the national defense-industrial base. 16 
The growing defense -industrial role o r the private sector in t hese sta tes is faci litating the de-
velopment of increa singly extens ive t ransna liona l interfirm linkages. TIle fact th at de fense 
industr i3lization is so wel l grounded in the general industrial envi ronment of the slate in-
creases the prospects that the emerging industr ia l states will exhibit increasingly impressive 
defense -industrial capabilities_ 
The impacl of this tren d is readily apparent. Very impressive d efen.'ie-indllstr ial progress 
has been registered by the emerging industrial states, which are demonstrating a growing 
capacity tu develop and produce a broad range of sophisticated arms, in cluding ai rcraft, 
armored vehicles, and missile s~·stcms. A number of these states, such as South Korea al 1<1 
Singapore, are even emerging as important arms exporters in their own right. Even morl' 
significant is the growi ng involvement of emerging industr ial ,~ta lc-based firms in defense 
induslri al programs in the developed industr ial states, such as the American-led Joint Strikl' 
fighter (JSF) program. ~ J 
While the emerging industria l s tates are closing the defense-industrial capability gap 
with the developed industrial states, this is not validating the classical model of defensl' 
industrialization, The pattern of defense industrialization in these states is contrary to whal 
is expected, as the ongoing role of foreign industrial and technological assets in dcl('l l~(' 
industrialization in these states is incompatible with the objective of national 3tltolHllllr 
The emerging ind ustrial slates are sacrificing defense-industrial self- reliance in the inkl (".1 
of proViding a basis for sustainable long-term progress, though the fact that this is hil~' " I 
011 in terfirm col laboration, wh ich is more difficult fo r authorit ies in o ther states to (0111 I I II. 
lessens the degree o f vulnerability involved. 
THE PROSPECTS OF DEFENSE 1~DUSTR1AUZATION 
While even the developed ind ustrial states face major obstacles in developi ng alld 111.11 11 
taining defcnse-i ndust rial capabi lities, those confronting devel upin g states are la l 111 11 11' 
daunting. The particular difficult ies involved in developing defense industri es in st,I!l", I ~ I' " 
are less we]] en dowed with industrial capabili t ies and natural resources have hl:{' 11 "" 1,.1 
since the 1930s, when a scholarly body uf literature on the subject begal1 to elllt!rgr."· 
The defense-indust rial programs of m any developing states h ave been beset hy pn ,11 1.11,-
as authorities have struggleu to acquire, master, and apply complex advanced tCI.:II1 II 01 111: 1, '. 
Political authorities face daunting challenges of a structural nature, resoun:I.' (11,1111 '1 11\1 ' 
and in some cases attitlldinal challenges, which continue to limit the scope fOI dell'll'" Ij. 
dustrial progress in many cases . 'l he str uctur al ohstacles they face slem from thl' il Ie 'LIIII,I, 
restricted access to crucial techn ologies and produclion equipment, resul ri ng 1111111 II I' I. " 
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that, in most cases, these originate in the ~kvdop(!(1 induslria l sl all':i ilnd mar tw ,'mhjcci 
In supply-side Will rols. Rcsoll n: l' o!>sl,ICk's p n ll'!1 I iil il y i n..:1ud .... 11u.' dnl1ll'S\ io: ri na IKi'll, Ic..:h · 
nolngkal. i nduslriHl, and t'csli ng ill rnlstru Clul'l!' l'l'S(l llI'CCS needed 10 develop lIlld produ ce.' 
ar m s, ' I Ill' Ii nand;]1 n.'quirt'IH(·I1IS of bot h R&D and pmdll ( lion hnv<.: soarl:'d ;lS I~'c h l1olo p,i-
cal fnJlIl k'r.'i advalH.:c. ALt i'ludinal ohslacll's nrt.' evidcllt in .1 Illll11bc r or CilSI,':; wheri.' polili (,;ll 
authoritics in developing states have proven I'l'lll(" tani 10 consider locally dcydop~'d ilnd 
produced ar ms as good as those that arc avai Jablt' frolll more c~! ahlishcd $llppl i e rs.'·l'l (llhi~ 
111\11'1 be addt'(1 thl' negat ive impact (Ill Ih(' 1(1 "~ te rm dcv(~ lopnll' n l of dd{~ 11 S<.' industriid 
capabll il it:s (I I the Icm[c'ncy, ill SOIl1," case's, til undert ake t hl' development and product ion 
uf arm:-; Iha l involv(' tllO many tl'chnical risks giVt'1l I:stahl if- h1.!d lo(. ai capahili ties. 
'11K' p"slwill' record of IlHIlY develuping stales, p<.ll'linilarly ill terms of 1'IdvnlH,:cd arm:.:, 
Ll's lilil'l' til Ilw l'llduring tiiHicultks ll1l'Y facl'. ' lh is h"s b(:cl1 lll ilnHl'st in pmgmm ddilYs, es -
calating cosl.s, I!.',.:hllologic.:<:ll compromiscs, tInd Ihe abort ive IHlhlre or T11~n y p r()jec lli . Many 
dcvdllpillg slates have fai led to risl' above vcry bilSk kvds nf defe nse industria! I..:ompc 
teney. <Iud in fcw cases has the dcvdoplllcll l or delclIs(:'-induslria! ... :apnbililies in develop-
ing stales kepi IXK:t.' wit b exp;,lnd ill,g kchnolngical rf(Jlllier~. Whi le the devdopl1lc nta l <lnd 
produclioll harr iers involved in Inw- tcchnolng}' ,Hill . such as small arms and ligh t W~;lptl n S 
are casily surmounted by an but the most 1I1Hlcnkwlopcd o( :.;[alt~ > those illvolved ill high-
technology arms have r iscn steadily and nliltinL l ~' It) rise. 'lh i~ has major implil:at iulls (()f 
the long-term prospects of defense indus tl'i.1I 1 z~l! iOI1 ill nllls! developi ng stutes, including in 
tl 'rlll !' ofhtltl, '1I 1Iu l1(01), and sw;t ainabilily. 
I h'l e n~t' · indlls lri :t 1 autonomy is \'Cry dj lTicul t to achieve, even for the developed indus -
I r i,l l ~ta\es. ' I Ill.:' scope for developing a t ru l>, independent de fense-industrial base is lim -
Ill'l l, exct..'pt i ll ca:-;cs whe re polilical <lllihorilics arc in a position and prepared to devote the 
IlI' f~'SS;\(y rcsniJ ret's. Establ ish i JIg J geml inely <lu\onomutls de [el1sc-! nd IIs ll'i<l1 baSt' rc:qu ires 
' tl .l)I ,r resotl n.:('s II nless l.ocal arms rC~llI i r~mcnts arc limited to ullsophisilcatnl arms su .. h itS 
·. Il I.1I1 ;1rI1l$, light weapons, and motu!' trallsport vchidt.'s. this is rarely the ~a.o; l', As Stcph.luie 
Ndll1lall poi nls 011 1. defensc-imh lstria l s~,.' l f- n:li an(t.' hilS not even been achieved by most or 
I hi' d"vd opcd i ndll;;t r jal sta les. ! j l '1111.,' difIl(lllti~s fa(cd by d ~'vcl(lping. stales arc In IIch grrHlcr 
d l l ~ ' 10 Ila-il' <iilli .:ulLiL's in r11 11slt:.' ring th~ require<1 fesuurces, including in terlllS ofii nanci<l l. 
I . ' , Itll lli llgical. ;lIld infrastructure resources, MO.')t (,k~vcloping stales cannot slls ta in Ihe high 
1.' \1' [-. of ilwcslmcllt l1('cessClrY to devt'lop an infJ'il sl rllclul'l' of adv,lI1ccd test ing facilities 
~ , II .1:' wi lld tUllIlI.:·!:->, for ex.ample, 
1"1 mnst dcwlopi ng indust rial slales, dd cn ' c - jlldll~ t ri al aUlonomy remai ns an el usive 
... 11 IlId ia:" 'Icjas light comb,11 ai rct'<lft (l.e A). which has been under dt' vdopmcllt sincC' 
~ " tl ~ I " t ~ l'x p'cricnced major delays, and now is. not scheduled til be fi elded Lliltil 20W, for 
, '\"'1,1,· I:,ven Ihis limdrame will only hf..' attainable d l le 10 I he:' Ino ian gow r n llicnl:5 \\·il ling. 
r ,, " , '. 1,1 l nlllpromise its requirement of a U lOll 0 Iny. Inslead or being complete! y i Ild igcllOliSly 
,"">lI'.II I'l ! ;l n o produced as was intended, the Tejas will incorporate signi flGtI1l foreign COIil -
1'"I1"lIl s ;I Jld design inputs, Zl 
" ll1l1l.lI ly, "chil'vi ng defcl15e-ind uslrinl suSI a inability has proven to be difficult fo r 
, ... ~ , ,I. \ "Iuping slates. The d itlicu it it"s irwolved in developing sustainahtc defense- in-
I. 111 ,, 1 •• Ipal)ilit ics are more acute for developing states, which often lack extensive com-
I I II , II . (ltstria l bas.es llpon which to e:: tabli sh such activi ty, In many cases, defense 
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induslrialization efforts result in the development of "enclave" i ndustrie~ that are relatively 
isolated from the civil sector, which complicates efforts to sustain them and requires greater 
state resources. Most developing states are poorly positioned to bear thi s burden. 1\ot only 
do they face major difficuLties in providing the ongoing financia l support thaI this generally 
requires, but they also often experience difficulties in providing ~ufficicnt industrial and 
technological resources and the necessary infrastructure for R&D.12 
For most developing states, defense-industri al aUlonomy and sllstainability are practical 
only in terms of unsophisticated arms. Most developing slates will continue to require on-
going foreign assistance for anything more than this . In many cases, arms transfers, the off-
sets that accompany them, and dual-use technologies will continue to be crucial to defense 
industrializat ion. The extent to which this involves cont inued relat ionships of dependence, 
with all lhat this entai ls for developing states, m ay be mHigated by technological globaliza-
tion, even for those developing states thal are not extensively integrated in to the global 
economy. Deepening technological globalization complicates efforts by states Lo control 
out\-vard technological diffusion, increasing the ch ances for developing states to circum-
vent political barriers to the diffusion of arms-related technologies. The long-term defense -
industria l prospects forthe emerging industrial slates are relatively positive, but only because 
their p arlicular developmental model effectively foregoes autonomy. Defense industria liza -
tion in these states is being pursued in concert with general industrial and technological 
progress in the context of participation in the global economy. 
The changing supply-side dynamic resulting from the emergence of new arms uppliers 
also stands to benefit defense industr ialization in Jeveloping states. A number of d evelop 
ing states, of which the emerging inJustrial states are most prominent, are enhancing the;, 
capabilities to supply arm- related components, technologies, and production equipmellt. 
and to provide testing facilities. The increasing range of potential suppliers for many itcl1l~ 
provides developing states with greater ch<liccs and reduces the potential for individual 
suppliers to use arms transfer relatiO! ships as instruments of political leverage. 
The Benefits of Limited Defense industrialization 
Defense industrialization in developin g stales often fa ils to produce nationaL capabillllL'" 
sufficiently comprehensive and autonomous to free these states from thei r dependenn' (Ill 
foreign suppliers. Nonetheless, defense industrialization is often conside red valualll, ' II 
continues to be supported, as it helps to insulale states from some of the mo re immed l.ll, 
effects of restrict ions on access to arms supplies. Even the production of basic sma ll al i i" . 
and artillery ammunition can provide a state with some capacity to engage in combat Wit I, 
out immediate resllppl y, and relatively si mple m easures such as a local capacity to S I II 11,1 \ 
smail arms and to undertake vehicle main tenance can significantly enhance this. ' I ll!' 11" II , 
sophisticated the local defense indusLry and the less dependent it is on foreign comp" I il'IIh 
production equipment, and experlise, the greater the scope for autonomous actioll 1',1 I'" 
li tical authori ties. 
Limited defense industrialization has the added benefit of helping to l'L'd lll" t I,. 
costs of supporting the local defense establishment while also supporting d() I IH',~t" I" 
dustry. In some cases, such as in Brazi1 during the 1970s and 1980s, limited ,1.01, II '·, 
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industria lization has provid ed the basis for profitable cxports.1J Some stales are prepared to 
accept less autonomous defense-industrial capabilities to develop while developing signiti-
cant export capabilities as a result. 'The actual contribution of defense industrialization to 
economic development varies greatly. It may be quite limited where defense and civil indus -
tr ies arc effectively isolated, where defense industrial ization is inappropriate in commercial 
te rms, or where s tates Jack the capacity to exploit the opportunities provided, hut significant 
spillover to 10c<.11 indust ry may resul L 24 
THF IMPLICATIONS OF DEFE:-..rSE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
As outlined above, th e re is little apparent threat to the established hierarchy of defense-
industrhtl producers . With few exceptions, the defens~ industries of developing s tates are 
still emerging despite some determined efforts to narrow, if not close, the defense-industrial 
capabilily gap with the developed industrial Mates. 'Lhe exceptions are the emerging indus-
trial states, but in these cases the distinct nature of defense industrialization ensures that 
local capabilities will remain closely lin ked to those of more established defense-industrial 
producers. 
Defense industria lization entails major politico-military implications for the developing 
stales where this is bei ng pursued and for the states that deal with them. TIle implications 
of defense induslri alization vary considerably from case to case. 'Ihis is due in large part to 
the very uneven record of defense industrialization in developing sta les and the differing 
positions of developed industrial s tates. 
The issue of I he impact of defense industrialization on the world military order has been 
dco(l ted for some time. Many observers note the potential for th is to enable developing and 
l'lllcrging industrial states to overcome the established center/periphery distinction in mili -
l:try capabilitieH.~s The politico-military implications of defense industrialization depend 
I II large part upon local progress. In most developing states, defense -industrial progress 
h.ts l)een very modcst, with states restr icted to providing basic supplies, such as small arms 
.1I11llltlIlition, and a limited maintenance capacity, or a capacity to assemble or coproduce 
,I limited range of equipment. Depot-level maintenance, production, and R&D of sophis-
li t .Iled arms remain beyo nd the scope of most developing states. In these cases, defense 
Ill dlis trialization poses no threat to the hierarchy of military powers. 
I )dense industrialization is contributing to the developmen l of more advanced mili -
1111)' l'apab ilities in sOJrte developing sta tes. A number of developing states ilre enhancing 
IJlI'il ~'1pacity to provide or support crucial types of arms, and some s tates are dewlopi ng 
1,11·,1.li lll'd defense- industrlal capabilities in particular areas as a result of their capacity for 
I(I",[) ;l.<; well as produclion. The capacity to draw on indigenous industrial infrastructure 
1 .111 grl'.lliy enhance the political utility of the defense establishment. This sterns from the 
11111' '' 1 1 a 11 ( (': of being able to maintain crucial arms during limes of tension or crisis, and to 
I' /,1.1\ (' any equipment losses. 
Ill\' il'suc of the implications of defense industrialization [or the poJitical independence 
III .\1 I'duping states is quite complex. This is complicated by the declin ing scope for po-
lill •. iI il' v,.:rage resulting from the increasingly tramnation al nalure of arms-rela ted R&D 
,,,,, I l'illl ili c tion. The scope for political influence ViCl arms transfers varies between cases. 
238 The Modern Defense Industry 
Dependence on an arms supplier does not necessarily translate into political leverage on its 
part, but the scope for leverage is greatest in cases where the recipients are dependent on 
particular arms suppliers. 2b 'Jhe changing nature of the arms supply environment result -
ing from the rise of nontraditional emerging industrial state suppliers is broaden ing the 
options for arms importers, potentially providing political aUlhorities in developing states 
with greater scope to avoid such situations. As a result, the failu re of developing states to 
develop autonomous comprehensive defense-induslrial capabilities does not necessari ly in-
volve as high a political cost as once was the case. 
Defense industrialization has major implications in terms of the capacity of estahlished 
defense-industrial producers to develop and implement effective arms embargoes. 'Ihe in-
creasing number of suppliers that must be included in order to ensure the effectiveness 
of arms embargoes complicates such efforts. It was noted as far back as the 1980s that the 
emergence of significant defense industries in newly industrialized states such as Brazil, 
Israel, and South Africa was enabling them to supply arms to sLates that Were unable to 
secure arms from their traditional suppliers due to their political positions or human rights 
records.)7 At thc same time, however, the central importance in developing state defense in-
du ·tries of a rm,~ - related R&D and production processes that are based elsewhere provides 
considerable scopc for political influence, should political authorit ies in supplkr states be 
prepared to go to the lengths necessary to restrict access in the current environment. As 
a result, the influence of a stale wiLh the resources of the Un ited States is noL necessari ly 
diminished by "defense globalizatiol1:'z,~ 
In addition, it is more difIicult to secure state support for controls on arms- rel(lted COni 
poncnts, production equipment. and technology than complete anm. Defense industri'11 
ization in developing states is not neariy as controversial as the issue of arms transrers III 
developing states, and so tends to generate less puhlic demands on policy commun it il':-' 
to intervene to prevenL it. As a result, processes co ntrihuting to defense induSlria lizal iOll 
in developing states can be expecled Lo remain less subject to external controls than ;trl ll' 
transfers themse l ve,~. 
This issue is somewhat acadern ie in that most of the developed industrial states 111 :11 
are in a posi tion 10 do so do not seek to employ arms lransfers as instruments of ill nUl' lll ,. 
except in isolated cases. 'ihis generally occurs when developing staLes are considered to I II" 
acting bcyond the pale ill terms of human rights. Tn these cases, defense induslrial i'l.allOiI 
in the developing states might have a particul arly significant impact, providing the pIII,'11 
t ial for political authorities to pursue important national objectives without regard 1111 I I1I 
norms and 'wishes of the interna tional community. This may provide them with coll~ilkl 
able scope to deny hasic civil liberties and violale human rights. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The importance attached to defense industrialization in the developing states is lll dd· , I; 
to abate, given its potential advantages in both politico -military and economic lei III', III' 
scope for most of these states to become self-reliant in defense-industrial terms i,'i VI'I \ 11111 
iled, however, and will remain so. 
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1 here is a n important group of developing states where defense -industrird develop-
ment is likely to prove more significant Dver the long term. Defense industrialization in 
the emerging industrial states does not correspond to the expectations of many observers, 
but their development of increasingly sophisticated general industrial capabilities across a 
broad range ofprodllct areas is providing them with a basis [or sustained defense-industrial 
development. The overlapping nature of their commercial and military sectors and thei r 
extensive integrat ion into transnational industrial processes means that their defense-in -
dustrial bases will not be autonomO lls, but it a lso means that they will have much readier 
access to ex ternal defense-i ndustrial resources, and that they wil l constitute increasingly 
important contributors to defense-related R&D and production in other stales. 
The politico-military implications of the development of defense- industrial capabilities 
of the emerging industrial states are considerable. Not only does it have the potential to reo -
der these states increasingly resistant to efforts to employ access to arms at) an instrument 
of in (luence, but it also is providing them With an increasing capaci ty to supplemt'nt, if not 
supplant, established suppliers of arms to developing states. 1his will continue to erode the 
effectiveness of supply-side arms and technology controls. 
The nature of defense industrialization in the emerging industrial states highlights 
the inadequacy of established understandings of ucveloping state d efense industrialization. 
The chosen palh or defense industrialization in the emerging industrial states demonstrates the 
importance of reconsidering how we regard defense industrialization in developing states, and 
our understanding of the ro!c and importance of non-state actors and industrial processes. 
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